Traditionally, clinical laboratory data in safety assessment studies have been analyzed statistically to determine potential treatment-related effects. This has often led to inappropriate and/or controversial conclusions about clinical laboratory findings that are statistically significant but considered biologically unimportant. To overcome these problems, a decision-making process that integrates statistical analyses and sound medical judgment is required. Understanding the reasons why false-positive and false-negative results occur is the first step toward both better test selection and more accurate decisions on test material effects.
INTRODUCTION
What does clinical laboratory testing actually do?
What do the tests measure? Most do not measure distinct disease processes, per se. In a clinical case of diabetes, glucose does not &dquo;measure&dquo; the extent of the basic problem. You may have to look at a tissue biopsy and perhaps do some specific function testing. Most clinical laboratory tests give results that are reflections of the physiologic processes behind the disease or, in the case of safety assessment studies, the physiologic changes that result from the toxic effects of the test compound.
What makes a good test good? The clinical laboratory will want assays that are analytically accurate and precise. However, we need more information when deciding which tests are most useful diagnostically. The diagnostic sensitivity and diagnostic specificity of a test provides information on how often the test gives us a diagnostically correct answer. We need to know how often the test is positive when a significant drug or chemical effect is present (sensitivity) and negative when it is not present (specificity). Both of these factors can be combined into a term called diagnostic efficiency. Diagnostic efficiency, however, is diseaseor lesionspecific ; i.e., a test has a different diagnostic efficiency for every diagnosis. This creates a significant problem for us in toxicology because we often do not know exactly what lesions will be produced in safety assessment studies. We cannot determine the diagnostic efficiency of a test in a &dquo;screen for ev-erything&dquo; situation. The sensitivity, the specificity, and the diagnostic efficiency of a test also depend on the incidence rate of the lesion we want to detect (3) . If the incidence rate is high, even a diagnostically poor test may provide adequate diagnostic efficiency ; however, the opposite is also true. If the incidence rate is low, even a diagnostically very good test may not provide adequate diagnostic efficiency.
PROBABILISTIC INTERPRETATION
If we are testing a drug in which a diabetogenic effect is expected, the serum glucose concentration may be a good predictor of affected animals. However, if we are testing a drug with unknown effects and we observe an increase in serum glucose, we cannot immediately conclude that the effect is either diabetogenic or drug-related. Serum glucose concentration may increase for a number of reasons.
The diagnostic efficiency of glucose is different in these 2 situations. The glucose result must be interpreted probabilistically, rather than categorically, in the second situation.
What does &dquo;probabilistic interpretation&dquo; mean? When we say that we think a test result is positive and &dquo;X process&dquo; is present, we really mean the probability that &dquo;X&dquo; is present is high. Both a subjective evaluation and a statistical analysis are subject to a certain probability of making a correct or incorrect assessment of the toxicologic significance of a lab- oratory test result. If the assumptions used to evaluate the data are faulty, the probability of reaching an erroneous conclusion increases. This is a very important concept when one is setting a no-observable-effect level, particularly when based on a single test. Clinical laboratory tests too often provide convenient numbers that should not be directly interpreted (statistically or otherwise) as indicating a toxicologically significant event. I previously described a study designed in conjunction with a statistician to try to answer the question : &dquo;Why are there so many statistically significant clinical laboratory findings in safety assessment studies that we interpret as biologically insignificant ?&dquo; We looked at the biological and analytical variation of a number of clinical laboratory test results (2) . We also calculated a number of variance ratios. This is similar to the approach widely used in human clinical medicine to determine whether or not tests vary more within the population or over time within an individual.
There were so many differences in the variance patterns from one test to another that attempting to use 1 or 2 statistical approaches to determine accurately the toxicologic significance of the results of 30 or 40 clinical pathology tests would be very difficult. One would almost have to design a specific study for each and every laboratory test. However, our paper reported 3 general conclusions about the statistical evaluation of laboratory data in safety assessment studies. First, some improvements are needed in the statistical methods that we use. Second, we ought to look more carefully at the design of our safety assessment studies. Experimental design is extremely important when complicated variance patterns must be minimized. One of the designs that my co-author recommended for some parameters (but it would not be appropriate for all tests) is a repeated measures design (2) .
Third, the data evaluation approach that says &dquo;everything that is statistically significant must be toxicologically significant&dquo; is clearly incorrect, and we showed why it is incorrect. Safety assessment studies are not designed to account for the variation pattern of each and every test; therefore, statistics must be seen as a tool for pattern recognition in the subjective determination of toxicologic significance (an important and necessary tool, but just a tool). This is why we need better statistics. As any mechanic knows, the wrong tool for the job usually leads to a bad result. However, the final decision on toxicologic significance must be based on sound medical judgment. This approach also forces the responsibility for making and defending decisions about toxicologic significance onto the pathologists and toxicologists.
CUT-OFF POINTS AND REFERENCE RANGES
A cut-off point is a single value in a continuous data set at which we separate the diseased from the nondiseased population. Any data interpretation method (statistical or otherwise) that seeks to separate a population into 2 groups (e.g., affected and nonaffected) based on the results from a test with a continuous range of results (e.g., not 1 +, 2+, or 3 +) establishes a cut-off point regardless of whether or not this value is ever actually stated. The data given in Fig. 1 illustrate this point. The x-axis shows the leukocyte count and the y-axis shows the relative number of patients affected. All the subjects in this study had a fever, 50% due to sepsis and 50% for a reason other than a bacterial infection. The data were graphed to demonstrate how the leukocyte count performed in predicting the presence of sepsis in subjects with a fever. As you can see, there is quite an overlap in the range of results between the &dquo;septic group&dquo; and the group that had a fever without sepsis. Where is the best place to set the cut-off point if the leukocyte count had to be used to predict sepsis? If we put it at 10,000/~1, we will have a lot of false-positives, because all of the nonseptic subjects with counts higher than 10,000/,41 will be considered positive. If we set the cut-off point at 20,OOOIAI, we will not misclassify any of the nonseptic subjects, but many septic subjects will be incorrectly classified. If we set it someplace in-between, we will make both kinds of mistakes. When the two populations between which we FIG. 1.-Comparison of leukocyte counts in septic and nonseptic groups of patients with fever. Incidence rate of sepsis = 50%. The diagnostic efficiency of the leukocyte count as a predictor of sepsis will depend on the cut-off point selected. are trying to distinguish have overlapping ranges of results, a cut-off point will always be a compromise between sensitivity and specificity. Armed with the proper background information, we can set cut-off points for tests in our safety assessment studies to provide us with the information we need to make diagnostic decisions. In any given study, we might wish to maximize sensitivity at the expense of specificity or vice versa. However, interpreting the significance of &dquo;borderline abnormal&dquo; results will always require caution and careful evaluation. As I will discuss later, we almost guarantee that the range of control and treated groups will overlap by the way we design our safety assessment studies.
Reference ranges or baseline data are frequently used to interpret data. However, reference ranges are not a panacea because they simply set a cut-off point using statistics. No matter how the data are transformed, reference ranges still set cut-off points that may result in high false-positive or negative rates. How well a reference range performs depends on the population from which the reference range was derived and the distribution of results in the control and treatment groups. We know from the human clinical laboratory literature that when chemistry &dquo;panels&dquo; are run, the larger the panel the higher the incidence of results outside the reference range (3) . Loading up chemistry profiles with diagnostically inefficient tests does not provide better information about the toxicity of a test material; it only makes determining the toxicologically significant problems more difficult by creating superfluous data. Figure 2 graphically illustrates a process of subjective data interpretation. The x-axis gives the relative change in a test result, and the y-axis represents the probability that a change would be considered biologically or toxicologically significant. If the change is small, we say the change is probably not important. As the change becomes larger, our confidence increases about the biological significance of the result. However, as you can see, there is a range of &dquo;uncertainty&dquo; in which we are not sure about the significance of a result. Procedures that establish a single cut-off point ignore the possibility that there might be a range of results in which uncertainty exists. Analysis of variance, reference ranges, and other overly simplistic approaches to data interpretation all suffer from this blind spot. Simply applying a cut-off point derived from these methods may provide a basis for palatable regulatory decisions, but it is a naive way of approaching data interpretation in safety assessment studies.
PREDICTIVE VALUE AND THE &dquo;EFFECT OF INCIDENCE&dquo;
I have one more quick topic to cover before I am out of time. Table I shows a comparison of &dquo;sink testing&dquo; (nontesting or &dquo;dry-labbing&dquo;), in which no positive results were reported, with an &dquo;actual test&dquo; with very high diagnostic efficiency (l, 4) . The number of false-positives and false-negatives in the &dquo;near-perfect&dquo; test adds up to 500 (add highlighted values for the &dquo;actual test&dquo;). This is more than double the number of incorrect results reported by not testing and reporting all results as negative (i.e., 200). The point of this illustration is to show that even if we have near-perfect diagnostic efficiency, the disease incidence can have a big impact on the usefulness of our test results. In this situation, the predictive value of a negative result is nearly 100%, while the predictive value of a positive test is only about 28%. While there will not be many positives, they will not mean much diagnostically when they occur. If the disease incidence increases, the near-perfect test will greatly outperform the &dquo;sink test&dquo; (4) .
What does this have to do with safety assessment testing? We design our studies, often by requirement, with a high dose level that should guarantee toxicity and a low dose level that should not show any effects. So our &dquo;disease incidence&dquo; should be high in the high dose group and very low in the low dose group. Yet, we usually fail to take this into account when we interpret test results. A trend test may help some, but in a situation in which nearly identical borderline results are obtained in the high and low dose groups, the trend test would not indicate that these results should be interpreted dif-ferently. Using multiple doses in a safety assessment study is sound toxicology, but it almost guarantees that we will see borderline results that will be difficult to interpret. The dose-response effect that this type of study design seeks to establish may help in interpreting the significance of a finding observed at several dose levels. However, we should not lose sight of the opposing effect that &dquo;incidence&dquo; may have on the predictive value of similar test results in different dose groups.
DISCUSSION
Dr. Loeb. In general, I agree with the points of your presentation. How do you communicate a probablistic interpretation, your client being the toxicologist or the regulator? Dr. Carakostas. Well, that is the $64,000 question. That is something I hope we can take home from this meeting today. I hope that the rest of the day is not a discussion of my favorite test and your favorite test and omithine decarboxylase, which is nobody's favorite test. I would like to see us discuss whatever tests we are going to discuss in light of the fact that we are all going to have situations that are specific to us. While you may have a very good reason to run a specific test for a specific reason, I may not. Forcing me to run your tests or forcing you to run my tests in a study situation may be a very inappropriate way of doing toxicology in order to get the safest products in the environment or as a drug or whatever. I also think this organization needs to begin to try to become a little more vocal about these issues with toxicologists, with regulatory people, and with clients, because we have a lot of educating to do. After we convince ourselves of what we believe to be correct, we need to convince the people with whom we interact in safety assessment on a daily basis.
